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ABSTRACT 
 
Shieha, Alaauddin (M.S., Telecommunication Engineering  
[Interdisciplinary Telecommunication Program]) 
Application Layer Firewall Using OpenFlow 
Thesis directed by Endowed Full Professor Douglas Sicker 
 
 
Security is one of the most important aspects in networking. Companies and service 
providers spend much money on expensive firewalls to enforce security. Software-Defined 
Networking (SDN) is a new architecture that can save companies and service providers money, 
reduce provisioning time from weeks to minutes, provide centralized management, promote 
innovation, and allow programmability. SDN achieves this by decoupling the control plane from 
the data plane. This paper demonstrates the benefits of implementing an application layer firewall 
using OpenFlow protocol, which is one way of implementing SDN. The firewall is capable of 
detecting application layer traffic, such as BitTorrent and YouTube, and of preventing some 
Denial-of-Service Attacks. This paper discusses the implementation details and provides a 
performance analysis of the firewall module.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Enterprises and service providers started to notice the limitations of conventional network 
architecture, which is inflexible compared to the server environment [1]. In addition, introducing 
any change in the conventional network is expensive and time consuming [1]. Software-Defined 
Networking (SDN) was suggested in 2005 in order to overcome conventional network architecture 
limitations. It is expected that SDN will enhance programmability and make it easier to configure 
and manage the network by decoupling the control plane from the data plane. 
OpenFlow is a communication protocol between the control plane and the data plane. It is 
supported by the Open Networking Foundation (ONF) [2]. This protocol can be used along with a 
piece of software that resides in the controller in order to implement routing, switching, a firewall, 
or a load balancer. Since some SDN controllers have only a simple built-in layer 2 firewall, 
enterprises would still have to buy a physical firewall to secure their network. The motivation 
behind this paper is to prove that SDN can replace expensive equipment such as layer 7 firewalls.     
The main contributions of this paper are: 
 Implementation of layer 7 firewall capable of blocking BitTorrent and YouTube 
traffic and preventing some Denial-of-Service attacks. 
  Performance analysis and comparison between OpenFlow controller and 
conventional switch.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In chapter 2, I summarize firewall 
history and technologies, introduce SDN architecture, explain OpenFlow protocol, compare SDN 
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controller, and note the importance of northbound APIs and SDN use cases. In chapter 3, I present 
the implementation details and explain BitTorrent and YouTube applications. In chapter 4, I show 
the results of the performance analysis. In chapter 5, I list the finds and future work. Finally, I 
conclude in chapter 6. 
 
*****  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
2.1 History of Firewalls 
Firewalls are either software components or hardware devices that enforce security policies 
in order to restrict unauthorized network access. The security policies filter network traffic 
based on the information in one or more of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) layers 
[3]–[5]. Even though the term firewall is widely used as a technical term, it was originally used 
by Lightoler in 1764 to describe a wall that confined a potential fire from spreading from one 
location to another [5]. The term was used also to describe the iron walls  behind the engine 
compartment of steam trains. These iron walls were used to stop fire from spreading to the 
passenger compartment. 
Routers were considered the first network firewalls in the late 1980s because they were 
used to separate a network into different broadcast domains. This separation limited problems 
from a domain or local area network (LAN) from affecting the whole network. In addition, 
routers helped isolating “chatty” protocols, which use broadcasts messages for communication, 
from affecting the bandwidth of the rest of the network [5], [6]. 
2.1.1 Why We Need Firewalls 
Firewalls can be used to enforce security policies for the following reasons: 
 To secure the underlying operating systems by preventing some types of 
communication, malware, attacks, etc. [5]. 
 To limit access to information on the Internet, an example of which is the filtering 
rules mandated in the United States by the Children’s Internet Protection Act 
(CHIPA) [5]. 
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 To prevent information leaks to the outside. 
 To enforce policy on network traffic. 
 To provide auditing information for the network administrator. 
2.1.2 Firewall Types in Historical Order 
In 1989, Jeffery Mogul described a solution that worked at the application layer to 
decide whether or not to pass packets through a router [5], [7]. His solution was to monitor 
the source address, destination address, protocol type, and port numbers to make the 
decision to allow or deny packets. However, Mogul’s solution considered neither the state 
of TCP connections nor the pseudo-state of UDP traffic [5]. The first commercial firewall 
was developed by Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) and was based on the technology 
proposed by Mogul. However, Marcus Ranum at DEC rewrote the rest of the firewall code 
after inventing security proxies, and the final firewall product was called DEC Secure 
External Access Link (SEAL) [5], [6]. A chemical company was the first to have DEC 
SEAL on June 13, 1991 [5], [6]. The DEC SEAL consisted of three devices, shown in 
figure 1: an application proxy server called Gatekeeper, a packet filtering gateway called 
Gate, and an internal mail server called Mailgate. 
Traffic from inside to outside should pass through the Gate and then to the 
Gatekeeper, which decided whether the traffic would be allowed to be sent to the 
destination. Traffic was not allowed to be sent directly from the source to the destination 
without passing through the Gatekeeper [5]. 
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Figure 1: DEC SEAL - First Commercial Firewall [6] 
 Application level proxies such as DEC SEAL provide good security and auditing 
capabilities because each packet is stopped at the proxy firewall, then examined, and finally 
recreated if it passes the rules. However, one drawback of this process is that a new application 
type requires a new application proxy to be developed. Moreover, the client program must be 
modified to account for the proxy in the network. A final drawback is performance, as each packet 
has to be decapsulated and encapsulated two times, one at the Gatekeeper and one at the final 
destination [5]. 
 During the same time DEC was working on SEAL, Cheswick and Presotto at AT&T Bell 
Labs were designing a proxy-based firewall that worked at the transport layer, rather than at the 
application layer proxy as in DEC SEAL [8]. This design had the same issue that DEC SEAL had, 
which is the lack of performance as each packet was required to cross the network protocol stack 
two times [5]. Cheswick reported that the file transfer speed without the proxy was around 60-90 
Kbps, while it was around 17-44 Kbps with the proxy. Furthermore, client programs need to be 
modified to account for the proxy-like application layer proxies. 
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  In order to simplify the use of proxies, David Kolbas developed Socket Secure protocol 
(SOCKS), which routes traffic between a server and a client through a proxy. Some web browsers 
such as Netscape supported SOCKS. Avolio and Ranum released the source code of the Trusted 
Information Systems (TIS) Firewall Toolkit (FWTK) on October 1, 1993. This toolkit supported 
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), Network Transport Protocol (NTP), Telnet, File Transfer 
Protocol (FTP), and  generic circuit-level application proxies [9]. However, FWTK did not support 
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) services. In 1994, Check Point introduced Firewall-1, which had 
a user friendly interface that simplified the installation and administration of the firewall [6]. The 
TIS firewall became the Network Associates Incorporation’s (NAI) Gauntlet Internet firewall after 
the merger between TIS and NAI in 1998 [5]. 
 Packet filtering firewalls started with Mogul’s paper [5]. This type of firewall is much 
faster than the application and transport layer proxies because it does not require the packet to 
traverse the OSI network stack twice. In addition, it does not require any changes on the user side. 
Packet Filtering firewalls filter packets based on one or more of the following parameters: source 
address, destination address, options in the packet header, options in the segment header (TCP or 
UDP header), and the physical interface number [5]. Even though packet filtering firewalls are 
faster compared to proxies, there are disadvantages. First, configuring the filter rules is complex 
and error-prone. Second, the IP addresses could be spoofed by attackers. Last, the original packet 
filter firewalls were stateless, i.e. they did not keep track of the state of the connections; therefore, 
an attacker might bypass the firewall by claiming to be part of an existing TCP connection [5]. As 
a result, stateful firewalls were developed to keep track of TCP sessions and to allow packets 
coming from outside to access the network as long as they belonged to an active session. Darren 
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Reed was the first to implement that concept in his IP Filter (IPF) version 3.0 in 1996 [5]; however, 
the first published peer-reviewed paper was by Chow and Julkunen in 1998 [5]. 
 Network Address Translation (NAT) is considered to be a layer of protection similar to 
that provided by proxies since the inside network is isolated from the outside network through the 
router performing NAT. NAT device replaces the source IP address of the outbound packet with 
its own IP address, and it might also change the source port number of the packet to a random 
unused port number above 1024 and map that into a table to keep track of each translation. 
However, one drawback of NAT is that it might interfere with Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) 
operation, which uses a set of cryptography algorithms to ensure the integrity of Data [5], [10]. 
 In addition to the previous types, there are some packet filter firewalls and proxies that 
work on the data link layer but still use the information in layer 2 – 4 to filter the packets. Working 
on layer 2 makes a firewall / proxy transparent at the network level, meaning that it could be placed 
anywhere in the network and that it neither requires  an IP address to operate (except for 
management) nor changes to the host operating system; therefore, the installation time could be 
minimal [5]. 
 Signature-based firewall, which might work at the user level as a transparent proxy, 
monitors the payload for known malicious strings in order to prevent an attack from happening. 
This approach is sometimes called “fingerprint scrubber” or “application scrubbing” [5]. Snort is 
an intrusion detection system that Hogwash firewall uses to drop packets that match the rules [11]. 
The emergence of new technologies such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and Peer-to-
Peer (P2P) networking raise new challenges for previous firewalls. For example. if the laptop’s 
security of a remote-user who uses VPN to access the internal network of a company is breached, 
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then the entire inside network might be accessible by the attacker [5]. In addition, a software bug 
in P2P programs such as Gnutella could be used by attackers to gain access to the victim’s host 
[5].  
2.2 Software Defined Networking (SDN) 
SDN is a network architectural paradigm that separates the control plane, which is the logic 
that controls how traffic is forwarded from the data plane of a networking device, which is the 
underlying system that forwards traffic, such as a router or a switch [12], [13]. Proponents of SDN 
believe that this separation provides the network operator with many advantages over the 
conventional network architecture, such as promoting innovation and features development. In 
addition, it provides the operator the ability to use less expensive commodity switching hardware 
under the control of a logically centralized programmatic control plane. This design uses elastic 
less-expensive computing power instead of over-priced high-end routing and switching products 
[14], [15]. Figure 2 illustrates the logical view of SDN architecture. 
Even though the separation of the control and data planes is one of the fundamental principles 
of SDN, it is also the most controversial [16]. The location of the control plane and how far away 
it could be located from the data plane, whether or not all the functions in the control plane could 
be relocated, and the number of instances needed to provide high-availability are all highly debated 
topics [14].  
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Figure 2: Software-Defined Network Architecture [17] 
There are three approaches to the distribution of the control and data plane: the strictly 
centralized, the logically-centralized, and the full distributed control plane [14]. In the first 
approach, the switching devices are dumb yet fast devices under the control of a centralized 
controller, which is considered the brain of the network. However, this extreme approach does not 
scale well, and it introduces a single point of failure in the network [14]. In the second approach, 
logically-centralized control plane, the switching devices retain some of the control plane functions, 
such as MAC addresses learning or ARP processing while at the same time a centralized controller 
is allowed to handle other functions that utilize the underlay network (switching devices) [14]. The 
last approach is the classical distributed control plane that each device has in addition to one or 
more data plane. These distributed control planes have to cooperate with each other in order to 
have a functional network [14]. 
The control plane is the brain of the device. It exchanges protocol updates and system 
management messages [18]. It also maintains the routing table, which is also called the routing 
information base (RIB), through exchanging updates between other control plane instances in the 
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network (routing protocol updates) and the forwarding table [14]. The FIB, or forwarding 
information base, is just a reformatting of the stable RIB table into an ordered list with the most 
specific route for each IP prefix at the top [19]. The control plane provides the data plane with an 
accurate up-to-date forwarding table through an internal link [18]. The data plane could use 
different types of technology to store the FIB tables, such as hardware-accelerated software, 
application-specific integrated circuits (ASICS), field-programmable gate array (FPGA), or any 
combination [14], [18]. In addition to forwarding traffic, the data plane implements some advance 
features such as policers, access control lists, and class of service (COS) [18]. All traffic is 
compared against the FIB table entries once it enters an ingress port, and it is forwarded out an 
egress port. However, if there is no entry for a packet’s destination address, then the packet has to 
be sent to the control plane for further processing. In addition, the following conditions that might 
cause the same behavior are [19]: 
 Packets that are addressed to the router/switch, such as routing updates, pings, and trace 
routes. 
 Full FIB table. 
  IP packets that have the IP options field enabled. 
 Packets that require the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) to be generated. 
 Packets that require compression or encryption. 
 Packets in which the Time-To-Live (TTL) field has expired. 
 Packets that require fragmentation due to exceeding the Maximum Transmission Unit 
(MTU). 
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2.2.1 The Importance of the Separation 
 The separation of the data plane from the control plane is not a new idea. Network device 
manufacturers have applied the same concept to the multi-slot routers and switches that they built 
in the last 10 years [14]. The control plane is implemented on a dedicated card - Cisco usually calls 
it the supervisor engine. To provide high availability, two supervisor engines are required – and 
the forwarding plane is implemented on one or more cards (line cards) independently, as shown in 
figure 3 below [14]. However, the high cost of this design, along with other components, discussed 
below, is the motivation behind SDN.   
 
Figure 3: Control and data plane example implementation [14] 
 First, I discuss the scaling issue of the service, forwarding, and control cards. Service cards 
can support only a limited number of subscribers or services state based on the generation of the 
embedded CPUs that they have. It takes a great deal of time for equipment vendors to take 
advantage of a new processor family in their service cards. In addition, the forwarding and control 
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cards suffer from the same issue, which is the limitation of the embedded CPUs as well as the 
expensive memory that is limited in size [14]. Even though the SDN architecture still needs an 
upgrade in the control and service plane to accommodate scale, this upgrade could take advantage 
of the commercial off-the shelf (COTS) computing power that evolved dramatically and was 
driven by cloud computing [14].  
 Second, SDN will save large enterprises and service providers money on capital 
expenditure (CAPEX) since the cost of commodity devices is low in comparison to cost of high-
end routes and switches from well-known vendors [14], [20]. 
 Third, the separation of the control plane and data plane enables innovations in both planes 
since network operators would be able to provide new services by changing the software release 
independently from the hardware. This will also promote competition between enterprises or 
service providers to provide new services and features. 
Fourth, the separation would make the forwarding elements more stable due to the smaller 
codebase required to implement the same network functionality in comparison to the conventional 
way. It is common these days to consider a smaller codebase more stable than a longer one that 
had many feature upgrades, such as the Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) protocol [14]. 
Finally, in conventional networks, the greater the number of control planes, the more complex 
and fragile the system. That is, adding more devices (control planes) will impact the scale of the 
network, i.e. convergence time [14]. To address this issue, equipment vendors created the concept 
of system clusters where elements of the cluster are connected (through an external link) to create 
a single logical system controlled by a single control plane. A distributed control plane in the 
cluster is also available to provide load balancing. Even though this solution has characteristics of 
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SDN, it does not solve the programmability issues of the control plane. Thus, SDN architecture is 
more flexible and provides a centralized control plane that reduces the complexity of the system 
[14].          
 
2.3 OpenFlow Protocol 
In 2008, a group of engineers from Stanford University developed an open standard protocol 
called OpenFlow, which enables researchers to evaluate and run experimental protocols in an 
existing production network without exposing the internal network. To allow that, OpenFlow-
enabled switch must be able to isolate experimental traffic from production traffic through either 
applying Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs) or forwarding production traffic to the normal 
process of the switch [21]. OpenFlow protocol is a standard communications interface between 
the controller and the forwarding plane of the underlying network devices that allows network 
operators to manipulate the forwarding plane of these devices [17]. 
OpenFlow consists of a set of protocols and Application Programming Interface (API). The 
protocols are divided into two parts, as shown in figure 4 below: 
 The OpenFlow protocol, also called the wire protocol. This defines a message structure 
that enables the controller to add, update, and delete flow entries in the OpenFlow 
Logical Switch flow tables as well as to collect statistics [14], [22]. 
 The OpenFlow management and configuration protocol that defines an OpenFlow-
enabled switch as an abstraction layer called an OpenFlow Logical Switch. This 
enables high availability by allocating physical switch ports to a particular controller 
[23].  
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Figure 4: Relationship between components defined in the specification, the OF-CONFIG protocol 
and the OpenFlow protocol [23] 
 
2.3.1 OpenFlow Switch Components 
 An OpenFlow-enabled switch consists of a group table and one or more flow tables, one 
or more OpenFlow secure channels that connect the switch to an external controller, and an 
OpenFlow protocol that defines the control messages between the switch and the controller, as 
shown in figure 5 below [24]. 
 
Figure 5: Main components of an OpenFlow switch [25] 
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2.3.2 OpenFlow Ports 
An OpenFlow protocol has different port types that pass traffic between OpenFlow 
processing and the rest of the network. The OpenFlow standard ports are as follows: 
 Physical ports, which correspond to a hardware interface such as Ethernet switch port. 
 Logical ports, which do not correspond to a hardware interface directly, such as tunnels, 
loopback interfaces, and link aggregation groups.  
 Reserved ports, which are defined by the OpenFlow specification. The * means mandatory 
port. They define forwarding actions as follows [22]: 
o ALL *: Represents all the switch ports except the packet ingress port and ports 
configured with OFPPC_NO_FWD. It can be used only as an egress port. 
o CONTROLLER *: Represents the port to the OpenFlow controller.   
o TABLE *: Represents the beginning of the OpenFlow pipeline. It used as an output 
action in the “packet-out” message’s action list. 
o IN_PORT *: Represents the ingress port of the packet.   
o ANY *: Represents a wildcard value. 
o LOCAL: Represents the management stack of the local switch.   
o NORMAL: Represents the traditional layer 2 or layer 3 forwarding. 
o FLOOD: Represents flooding using the traditional pipeline of the switch to all ports 
except the ingress port and ports with flooding disabled state. 
2.3.3 Flow Table 
 Each entry in the flow table is made of the following fields, as shown in figure 6 [22]: 
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 Match fields: The matching criteria used against packets. They could be based on ingress 
port, packet headers, and metadata from the previous flow table. 
 Priority: Priority of the entry. The higher the number, the higher the priority.   
 Counters: This field increases when a packet matches an entry. 
 Instructions: Actions applied to matching packets. 
 Timeouts: This could be an idle-time or hard-time that specifies the amount of time before 
an entry expires 
 Cookie: This is not used to process packets, but it might be used by the controller to filter 
flows based on their types (statistics, modifications, and deletion). 
 Flags: This field changes how flow entries are managed; for example, an entry with the 
flag OFPFF_SEND_FLOW_REM means that a flow removed message will be sent to the 
comptroller once this entry is removed.  
 
Figure 6: Main components of a flow entry in a flow table [22] 
 
2.3.4 OpenFlow Message Types 
 There are three main categories for message types and each category has its own types. 
The main categories are: controller-to-switch, asynchronous, and symmetric. The controller-to-
switch messages are originated from the controller, and they might not require the switch to 
respond to them. The asynchronous messages are originated from the switch to notify the controller 
of a packet arrival, an error, or switch state change. Last, the symmetric messages are created, 
without solicitation, by either the controller or the switch [22]. 
 The sub-types of each category are as follows [22]: 
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2.3.4.1 Controller-to-Switch Messages: 
 Features: Sent by the controller to request the identity and capabilities of a switch that 
should reply with a feature reply message containing the requested information. 
 Configuration: Allows the controller to quest or sent configuration parameters in the switch. 
 Modify-State: Sent by the controller to add, delete, or modify flow entries or a group of 
entries in the OpenFlow table as well as to set the port properties of the switch. 
 Read-State: Uses multipart messages to read the current configuration and collect statistics 
and capabilities information from the switch. 
 Packet-out: Used by the controller to send packets out a specific port. This type of message 
should have either a full packet as raw data created by the controller or the buffer ID of the 
packet stored in the switch, which the controller received via Packet-in message. 
Furthermore, it should have a list of actions. If the list of actions is empty, the switch will 
drop the packet.  
 Barrier: Used by controller to request and reply messages to either receive notification once 
operations are completed or to confirm that message requirements have been met.   
 Role-Request: Used to set the OpenFlow channel’s role or query for it. This is helpful when 
the switch is connected to multiple controllers to provide redundancy. 
2.3.4.2 Asynchronous Messages 
 Packet-in: Generated by the switch and sent to the controller for processing. This can be 
triggered if there is no entry for the received packet in the flow table, if the output action 
of the flow entry is to send the packet to the controller, or if the packet needs other 
processing, such as TTL processing. Switches that support internal buffering will buffer 
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the packet and send a configurable number of bytes, 128 bytes by default, along with a 
buffer ID to the controller. However, if the switch does not support internal buffering or if 
the buffer is full, it has to send the full packet to the controller.   
 Flow-Removed: Used to notify the controller about the removal of a flow entry if that entry 
has the OFPFF_SEND_FLOW_REM flag. 
 Port-status: Used to notify the controller when a change to the port state or configuration 
occurs. 
 Error: Used to notify the controller of a problem.  
2.3.4.3 Symmetric 
 Hello: Exchanged between the controller and the switch during the connection setup phase. 
 Echo request/ reply: Used as keep-alive messages between the controller and the switch. 
They might also be used to measure the latency and bandwidth between them.  
 Experimenter: Used to test new features.  
2.3.5 Connection Setup 
 After configuring the switch with the IP address of the controller, the switch initiates a 
standard Transport Layer Security (TLS) or TCP connection to the controller listening on TCP 
port number 6653 or a user-specified TCP port. Once the TLS connection is established, each 
participant in the connection must send an OFPT_HELLO message with the highest protocol 
version supported by the sender in the version field. If the sent and received Hello messages 
contain OFPHET_VERSIONBITMAP, the negotiated version must be the highest version 
supported by both. Otherwise, the smallest version should be supported [22]. 
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 Upon successfully exchanging OFPT_HELLO messages and negotiating the protocol 
version number, the connection setup is completed and the OpenFlow messages described in the 
previous section can be exchanged; for example, the controller should first send an 
OFPT_FEATURE_REQUEST message to identify the Datapath ID of the switch, as the left side 
of figure 7 illustrates [22]. The right side of figure 7 shows an example of exchanging different 
OpenFlow messages. 
 
Figure 7: OpenFlow protocol messages [26] 
 
2.3.6 Multiple Controllers 
 To provide redundancy, high-availability, and load balancing, OpenFlow support multiple 
controllers that allow a switch to establish communication with each one of them. However, the 
handover process between the controllers is performed by the controllers themselves. The default 
role of the controller is EQUAL “OFPCR_ROLE_EQUAL”, which gives the controller full access 
to the switch. However, the role can be changed to SLAVE (read-only) “OFPCR_ROLE_SLAVE” 
upon the request of the controller [22]. 
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2.3.7 Flow Match Fields 
 Table 1 below explains the match fields that must be supported by the OpenFlow-enabled 
switch in its pipeline. 
Table 1: Required Match Fields [22] 
 
 
2.3.8 Action Structure 
 Table 2 below summarizes the actions that the controller could use with each entry, packet, 
or group. 
Table 2: Action Structure [22] 
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2.3.9 OF-Config Versions 
The OF-config protocol is structured around NETCONF protocol to set information related 
to OpenFlow on the network elements. With OF-config, the operator does not have to use other 
tools, such as FlowVisor to provide switch virtualization [14], [27]. Table 3 compares OF-config 
versions [14].  
Table 3: Capability progression of OF-Config [14] 
 
 
2.3.10 OpenFlow Versions 
 The Extensibility Working Group added new functionality and features to OpenFlow 
protocol v1.0. When OpenFlow protocol v1.3 was released in April 2012, the Open Networking 
Foundation (ONF) decided to slow down releasing new versions to allow for higher adaption rate 
of OpenFlow v1.3 and to focus on bug-fix releases [14]. Table 4 below compares OpenFlow v1.1 
– 1.3. 
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Table 4: The progression of enhancements to the OpenFlow pipeline from OF v1.1 through OF 
v1.3 [14] 
 
 
2.4 SDN Controllers 
There are several open source and commercial SDN controllers that have been developed. 
NOX/ POX, Floodlight, and OpenDaylight are examples of open source SDN controllers. On the 
other hand, Cisco OnePK controller is a commercial controller that integrates multiple southbound 
APIs. NOX is considered the first open source controller after being donated by Nicira to the 
research community in 2008. NOX provides a C++ OF v 1.0 API and an event-based programming 
model [28], [29]. POX is the Python version of NOX, and it supports the same graphical user 
interface (GUI) as NOX [30]. Table 5 below compares the features of some SDN controllers [12].  
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Table 5: Comparison among the controllers [12] 
 
 
2.5 Northbound APIs 
Even though SDN provides a way to program the network, it does not make it easy. SDN 
controllers such as NOX/ POX and Floodlight support a low-level interface that forces the 
applications to deal with the state of individual devices. Applications are developed as event 
handlers that respond to packet arrivals event. Having only a low-level interface, also called 
southbound interface, makes it extremely difficult to support multiple tasks/ module such as 
routing, switching, and firewall at the same time because the rules generated by one task/ module 
might have a conflict with the others (e.g., a rule to allow certain flow and another to deny it) [31]. 
Frenetic is projected to increase the level of abstraction and make developing applications for 
SDN much easier. It provides a suite of abstractions for defining rules, querying the state of the 
network, and updating rules in a consistent way [31]. 
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Pyretic is an SDN programming language embedded in Python, and it is a member of the 
Frenetic family. It also provides powerful abstractions that enable programmers to develop 
modular network applications as figure 8 shows [32]. One of the main advantages of Pyretic over 
traditional OpenFlow programming is that Pyretic offers parallel and sequential composition of 
policies in order to perform multiple tasks without worrying about potential policy conflicts. For 
example, in sequential composition, the output of the policy on the left of the operator (>>) is the 
input of the policy on the right of the operator, as shown in the Pyretic policy below [32]: 
match(dstip’2.2.2.8’) >> fwd(1) 
On the other hand, in parallel composition the operator (+) combines and applies two policies 
to the same packet, as shown in the routing policy R below, and forwards packets destined to 
2.2.2.8 out to port 1 and those destined to 2.2.2.9 out to port 2 [32]: 
R = (match(dstip=’2.2.2.8’) >> fwd(1)) + (match(dstip=’2.2.2.9’) >> fwd(2)) 
 
Figure 8: Northbound API [32] 
 
2.6 SDN Use Cases 
Since one of the main features of SDN is that it drives innovation [25], it is hard to 
summarize and imagine all SDN use cases. SDN could be utilized in campus, data center, cloud, 
and service provider networks [17]. 
 25 
 
Network administrators in campus networks could use the SDN model to enforce policies 
across the wireless and wired network consistently. In addition, SDN ensures an optimal user 
experience by supporting automated management of network resources and provisioning [17]. 
SDN architecture supports network virtualization that enables automated migration of 
virtual machine (VM) and hyper-scalability. Furthermore, it saves costs by reducing energy 
use and provides a better server utilization [17]. 
SDN also enables cloud service providers to allocate network resources in a very elastic 
way, which enhances provisioning. Moreover, SDN provides businesses with tools to safely 
manage their VMs in order to increase adaption of cloud services [17]. 
Considering the features that SDN brings, it is much easier for service providers to deploy 
resources optimally, to support multi-tenancy and to reduce both operational expenditure 
(OPEX) and CAPEX [17]. In addition, cellular service providers could utilize SDN to provide 
new services, such as base transceiver station (BTS) virtualization, and to reduce handover 
latency and many more [20], [33]–[35]. 
Finally, SDN could be used to replace expensive Layer 4-7 firewalls, load-balancers, and 
IPS/IDS with cost-effective high-performance switches and a logically centralized controller. 
In this paper, I have implemented Layer 7 firewall and managed to block several applications 
that are explained in the next chapter. 
 
***** 
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CHAPTER 3 
IMPLEMENTATIONS 
 
3.1 Setup and POX Controller 
 This chapter of the paper explains how to build a state-full application layer (layer 7) 
firewall as a module / component on POX controller. It also explains the required changes to POX 
controller and the limitations of the firewall module. The next section starts with the logical test 
bed setup.  
3.1.1 Test Bed Setup 
The test bed consists of Pica8 OpenFlow switch and a server that runs four VMs. One is 
the POX controller, which runs on Ubuntu server, while the rest are Windows and Ubuntu hosts. 
They are connected as shown in the logical topology in Figure 9. Pica8 has been configured to run 
as Open vSwitch (OVS). The configuration is in the appendix for reference. The OF switch is 
connected to the internet through port “1” and to the controller through the management interface 
“M”.  
 
Figure 9: Logical Test Bed 
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3.1.2 Pox Controller 
As mentioned in section 2.4, POX is a Python-based SDN controller. POX can be installed 
from GitHub quickly through the command: 
$ git clone http://github.com/noxrepo/pox 
$ 𝑐𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑥 
 
POX is invoked by running “pox.py” followed by the module name in the format 
“directory.filename.” For example, the following command will invoke POX and run a layer 2 
learning switch module located inside the “forwarding” directory: 
./pox.py forwarding.l2_learning 
Even though naming the module on the command line after “pox.py” is enough to load it, it 
is better if each module (component) contains a launch function. POX calls the launch function to 
initialize the module. It is basically a function that has the name “launch,” and it is also used to 
pass command line argument to the module. 
 POX provides an object called “core,” which serves as a rendezvous point between modules 
and as a central point for POX’s API so that they can interact with each other. Instead of having 
one module importing another module (through “import” statement), modules will “register” 
themselves on the “core” object [36]. There are two ways to register a module [36]: 
 Using core.register(): takes two arguments. The first is the name the user wants to 
use, and the second is the object. 
 Using core.registerNew(): takes generally a single argument, which is the class name. 
It might also take an optional argument and pass it to the __init__ method of the 
registered class. 
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POX uses an event based programing paradigm in which certain objects raise events, while 
others can listen to these specific events. In other words, when an event occurs, a piece of code 
usually known as “event handler” or “event listener” is called [36]. There are mainly two ways for 
an application to listen for events in POX [36]: 
1. Register a call back function for specific events fired by either the OpenFlow handler 
module or other modules through: 
core.openflow.addListenerByName(“EVENTNAME”,CALLBACK_FUNCTION, PRIORITY) 
2. Register an object with the OpenFlow handler module or other modules through: 
core.openflow.addListeners(self) 
 Once “core.openflow.addListners(self)” is called, it looks through the events of 
“core.openflow,” and if it finds a method on “self” with a name such as “_handle_EventName,” it 
registers that method as an event listener [36]. 
 In addition to event handling, POX provides a library for parsing and constructing well-
known packets [36]. All packet classes can be found in pox/lib/packet directory. Packets can be 
navigated either by using the “payload” attribute of the packet object or by using the “find()” 
method [36]. 
 To build a layer 7 firewall module, certain changes to the POX controller must be 
considered. First, the OpenFlow switch should send the complete packet payload to the controller. 
By default, it sends 128 bytes of the packet once it misses all the entries in the flow table [36]. 
This value might be enough to detect some, but not all, applications. Therefore, the miss send 
length value must be modified to reflect this, which could be done by changing the value of 
“core.openflow.miss_send_len” to 0x7fff during startup or by running “full_payload” module 
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along with the firewall module. Second, the firewall module will be responsible for classifying 
only the packets; thus, it needs to run with the switching module. However, running these two 
modules at the same time will cause OpenFlow error messages as both will try to access the same 
buffer ID. In addition, each module might send different rules to the OpenFlow switch, which 
would cause policy conflicts.  
There are two approaches to solve this issue. The first approach is combining the firewall 
module with the switch module and creating a “Master” class to manage the order of calling the 
module’s functions. This approach is similar to the concept of northbound APIs explained before, 
and it is the one implemented in this paper. The second approach is keeping the modules separated 
while modifying the switch module to listen to events fired by the firewall module instead of the 
ones fired by OpenFlow protocol (PacketIn events).  
3.2 Applications 
It is essential to understand how applications work in order to detect them. Therefore, this 
paper focuses on two types of applications that network administrators in enterprises or service 
providers might want to block/ throttle in order to save bandwidth or to prevent illegal use.   
3.2.1 BitTorrent Protocol 
 In order to detect BitTorrent traffic, it is important to understand how BitTorrent protocol 
works first. BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol for sharing distributed files. It enables 
multiple downloads of the same file simultaneously, making it possible for the file source to 
support a large number of downloaders without a large increase in its load [37]. 
BitTorrent file distribution consists of the following entities [37]: 
 A web server, which hosts the “metainfo” (“.torrent”) file. 
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 A “metainfo” file, which is an encoded dictionary that contains in the “info” filed 
information, such as the filename, length, and number of bytes in each piece of data and 
the announce URL of the tracker in the “announce” field. 
 A BitTorrent tracker, which is an HTTP/HTTPS service that maintains statistics about the 
torrent file and coordinates the action between all peers. 
 The end user BitTorrent client. 
The user downloads the .torrent file from the web server. The BitTorrent client runs the file 
and reads the info from the file and then sends an HTTP GET request to the tracker, which includes 
the info filed, peer ID, the total amount uploaded/ downloaded, and the User-Agent, as figure 10 
illustrates. The tracker responds with a list of peers’ IP addresses and IDs along with other 
information. The client uses this list to participate in the torrent by initiating connections to the 
peers [37]. 
   
Figure 10: Tracker HTTP GET Request 
 
BitTorrent’s peer protocol operates over either TCP or the uTorrent transport protocol (uTP). 
If TCP is used, the TCP handshake will start first, followed immediately by the required BitTorrent 
handshake, which is followed by a stream of length-prefixed messages. The BitTorrent handshake 
starts with character nineteen followed by a “BitTorrent protocol” string, as shown in figure 11 
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[37]. Eight reserved bytes come after the fixed headers, followed by 20-byte sha1 hash and 20-
byte peer id.  
 
Figure 11: Peer Wire Protocol Handshake over TCP 
 
Since BitTorrent uses multiple TCP connections, BitTorrent traffic will fill up the upload pipe 
(send buffer) quickly, which adds delay to all interactive traffic [38].  The reason is that TCP 
distributes the bandwidth equally between connections [38]. As a result, uTP was developed by 
Strigeus, Hazel, Shalunov, Norberg, and Cohen to solve this issue. uTP is a transport protocol layer 
built on top of UDP. It has its own congestion control mechanism that utilized the modem queue 
size in order to adjust its send rate [38]. 
 The connection setup is similar to that in TCP. However, BitTorrent handshake over uTP 
uses only three packets to establish the connection instead of four, as is the case with TCP. It is 
clear in figure 12 that the “BitTorrent protocol” string is in the third UDP packet of the flow. 
However, after capturing a lot of BitTorrent traffic, this string was also found in the fifth packet. 
This also implies that uTP has its own retransmission mechanism. 
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Figure 12: Peer Wire Protocol Handshake over UDP (uTP) 
 
 After studying the BitTorrent protocol and its peer protocol, it is clear that there are two 
ways to detect BitTorrent traffic, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. The first 
approach is detecting BitTorrent based on the User-Agent header string in the tracker HTTP GET 
request message, as shown in figure 10. Blocking this packet will prevent the user from receiving 
the list of peers and, as a result, the user will not have the required IPs to initiate any connection. 
The second approach is detecting the “BitTorrent protocol” string in the BitTorrent handshake. 
Blocking this packet will prevent the user from connecting to another peer as this message is 
required by the protocol to complete the connection. 
 The advantages of the first approach is that the number of trackers is small compared to 
the number of peers, i.e. the number of packets that need to be dropped using the first approach is 
less than those in the second approach. As a result, it requires less flow entries, which means less 
memory and load on the controller. However, the first approach has to account for all the User-
Agents, such as utorrent, Bittorrent, and BTWebClient, which will complicate the firewall code.  
In addition, a regular update to the code is required to account for new BitTorrent clients.  
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On the other hand, the firewall code that matches based on the “BitTorrent protocol” string 
requires an update only when the protocol itself is changed. However, it adds more load on the 
controller and OpenFlow switch resources, as previously noted. 
3.2.2 YouTube 
 Internet service providers use virtual servers in order to solve the problem of running out 
of IPv4 addresses. As a result a huge customer such as Google assigns multiple services to the 
same IP address. For example, a domain name system (DNS) query to different Google services 
might return the same IP address. Figure 13 illustrates a DNS look up for www.youtube.com and 
its resolved IP address. Using one of these IP addresses in the browser should return YouTube.com; 
however, it returns Googl.com as shown in figure 14. The solution that Google uses to redirect the 
user to the right service is to check the Host field in the HTTP GET request message, which has 
the name of the server. Therefore, trying to access YouTube by the resolved IP address will return 
the default service, which is Google search engine.  
 
Figure 13: Youtube.com DNS query 
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Figure 14: Requesting YouTube through its resolved IP address 
 
Therefore, blocking the HTTP GET message is enough to detect and block access to the 
YouTube website regardless of the IP address the DNS reply message returns. Figure 15 shows 
the Host field in different HTTP GET requests. This also works with embedded YouTube videos 
in websites that do not use SSL to encrypt the HTTP connection (HTTPS). 
 
Figure 15: Host Field in HTTP GET Request 
3.3 Flow Chart 
The flow chart below explains my implementation of the application layer firewall. It shows 
what happens to the packet from the moment it arrives at the switch port to the moment it leaves 
the switch to its final destination as figures 16, 17, and 18 illustrates. The process is as follows. 
Once the packet reaches the switch, the switch matches the information in the packet headers 
against its flow table entries. If there is a match, the switch applies the action located in the rule. 
However, if the packet misses all the entries, the switch forwards the complete packet to the 
controller for further processing.  The firewall module in the controller checks whether the packet 
is an IP packet or not. If it is not (ARP message, for example), it passes it to the switch module 
with instructions to install a flow entry through OpenFlow modification message. If it is an IP 
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packet, it proceeds to check whether or not it is a TCP or UDP packet. If not, it treats the packet 
in the same way that it treats non-IP packets. It is worth noting that an attacker might use ICMP 
messages, which are neither TCP nor UDP, to send and receive data [5]. However, this 
implementation does not take that into account. The next step is to check if the packet is coming 
from inside or outside as a way to implement a zone-based firewall. After this, the packet will be 
checked against the firewall table, which is a simple CSV file that can be updated before running 
the module. If the packet matches a rule/ policy, and the action assigned to that rule is ‘drop,’ the 
firewall module sends an OpenFlow modification message to instruct the OpenFlow switch to drop 
the packet for a configurable amount of idle-time/ hard-time. In addition, it will not pass the packet 
to the switch module. However, if there is no match or the action is ‘permit,’ the packet will be 
checked against the application table. This is to ensure that an application such as BitTorrent client 
is not using allowed port numbers to bypass the firewall polices. 
Since BitTorrent protocol might operate over TCP or UDP, it is important to consider both 
cases when implementing the firewall. It also important to keep the state of each flow until it is 
completely classified. As a result, at least four packets are required to detect both BitTorrent traffic, 
which uses TCP as transport protocol, and YouTube. In the case of BitTorrent over UDP (uTP), 
at least three UDP packets are required for classification; however, this implementation keeps the 
state of five UDP packets to consider for retransmission of lost packets, as shown if figure 17. 
The firewall module keeps the state of each flow inside a dictionary. The key of that dictionary 
is a unique combination of the source IP, destination IP, source port, and destination port. The 
value of each key consists of three elements: a counter, a string (signature), and a retransmission 
counter. The firewall module increments the first counter once a packet from an existing flow 
reaches the controller. The firewall module uses the signature along with TCP flags as a way to 
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insure that the packet has the expected direction. This prevents attackers from sending multiple 
TCP packets from one side in order to bypass the firewall rules. The second counter is used to 
count the number of retransmitted packets, which is helpful to prevent a denial-of-service attack 
by setting an upper limit for retransmission. 
It is important to mention the following scenarios. First, if the first TCP packet does not have 
the SYN flag, the firewall module will drop it and will not pass it to the switch module. This 
prevents attackers from sending TCP packets without a SYN flag or from establishing a TCP 
connection, and waiting until the idle-time expires to send, for example, a BitTorrent handshake. 
However, a packet belonging to an inactive session that does not support keepalive messages will 
be dropped, according to this policy. A solution to this issue is to flag the flow entry with 
OFPFF_SEND_FLOW_REM flag to instruct the switch to send flow removed message to the 
controller, which responds by adding the key back to the firewall flow table. Second, the UDP 
implementation of the firewall shown in figure 17 considers only BitTorrent protocol handshake 
and does not take into consideration other protocols. This will add extra delay and reduce the 
performance of other applications that use UDP and do not support a TCP-like handshake as the 
performance results in the next chapter show.     
The rest of the process is clearly explained in figure 16, 17, and 18. It is worth noting that the 
dashed line in figure 16 should be replaced with figure 17, which shows the process of only one 
direction (packets from inside-zone going to outside-zone) for simplicity. On the other hand, 
Figure 18 represents the switch module that is instructed by the firewall module to either install a 
flow entry in the OpenFlow switch or send the packet out without installing an entry. It is a 
modified version of the layer 2 learning switch that comes with POX controller. 
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Figure 16: Flowchart 1 of Firewall Module 
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Figure 17: Flowchart 2 of Firewall Module 
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Figure 18: Flowchart of Switch Module 
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CHAPTER 4 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter evaluates the performance of the implemented firewall. It compares the 
performance of the firewall module, combined with the switch module, with the performance of a 
traditional switch and the switch module only.  
The same test bed in figure 9 is used to conduct the performance analysis. IPERF [39], 
which is a tool for network performance measurement, is installed on both host one and host three. 
Each host has the same amount of memory and processing power. The bandwidth of all the links 
in this experiment is 1 Gbps. Pica8 switch is used also as a traditional switch since it supports both 
modes. 
In the first test, IPERF is used as a client on one host and as a server on the other host to 
send parallel UDP streams. The controller process is killed and restarted each time after running 
IPERF to insure that the OpenFlow switch is ready for the next test and has no flow entries. Figure 
19 shows the test results for multiple parallel streams and different modes. It is clear from figure 
19 that the firewall module (the blue line) introduces extra delay to the UDP streams compared 
with the traditional switch and the switch module running in the controller.  The reason is that the 
UDP implementation of the firewall module takes into account only uTP protocol (BitTorrent over 
UDP). Therefore, it expects a TCP-like handshake over UDP, which is not the case in IPERF, 
which sends UDP packets in just one direction (client to server). As a result, all the UDP packets 
will be forwarded to the controller, which has an upper limit for packets coming from one direction 
to prevent a DOS attack against itself. In addition, sending a flow entry to the switch to allow such 
behavior will create a security hole. For example, an attacker might send multiple UDP packets 
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from one side in order to bypass the controller and then start sending BitTorrent traffic. In the end, 
it is a trade-off between performance and security.    
 
Figure 19: Comparison between Firewall Module, Switch Module only, and Traditional Switch 
in Term of Jitter 
 Even though the firewall module suffers from a poor performance for UDP packets due to 
its security policy, the second test proves that it has a good TCP performance compared to a 
traditional switch. In this test, IPERF is used to send parallel TCP streams. The average throughput 
of 20, 50, and 100 streams is calculated for both traditional switch and the firewall module, as 
shown in figure 20.    
 
Figure 20: Comparison between Firewall Module and Traditional Switch in Term of Throughput 
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Figure 21 shows the effective throughput for 20 parallel TCP streams over conventional 
switch over 10 seconds. It is clear that the throughput in figure 21 is more stable than the 
throughput in figure 22, which is also for 20 parallel TCP streams but over an OpenFlow switch 
connected to POX controller running the firewall module. The reason is that the conventional 
switch uses the layer 2 forwarding table only to forward packets from host one to host three. The 
layer 2 forwarding table of a conventional switch is usually stored in a Content-Addressable 
Memory (CAM) and maps the MAC address to the egress port. It is worth noting that the switch 
uses the same entry in the MAC address table to forward all  20 parallel TCP streams. However, 
the OpenFlow switch uses TCAM to store the flow table that contains match fields up to layer 4. 
As a result, there is a unique entry for each TCP stream. Therefore, the difference in throughput 
between figure 21 and 22 is due to the difference in processing time. For example, it takes time for 
the Openflow switch to process a new flow before sending the packet out to the controller (for the 
first four TCP packets only from each stream), and it takes time for the controller to process the 
packet and send commands back to the OpenFlow switch.  
 
Figure 21: Throughput of 20 parallel TCP Steams over Conventional Switch 
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Figure 22: Throughput of 20 parallel TCP Steams with Controller Running Firewall Module 
 
Since the OpenFlow switch is connected to the controller through only one 1 Gbps link, 
the parallel TCP streams will not reach the controller at the same time. Therefore, some TCP 
streams will arrive later than others, and this will affect their throughput, as shown by both figure 
22 and figure 24 in second 1. Figures 23 and figure 24 both show throughput over 10 seconds after 
increasing the number of streams from 20 to 50 streams. 
 
Figure 23: Throughput of 50 parallel TCP Steams over Conventional Switch 
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Figure 24: Throughput of 50 parallel TCP Streams with Controller Running Firewall Module 
*****  
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CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS 
 
This paper demonstrates that it is possible to replace expensive specialized network 
hardware such as application layer firewalls with  commodity devices and a logically centralized 
SDN controller. Even though this implementation used POX, a Python-based controller considered 
slower than Java or C++ controllers, the performance analysis proved that the firewall module 
performed well in handling TCP traffic compared with a traditional switch. Despite the successful 
implementation in terms of delivery of an application layer firewall capable of blocking BitTorrent 
traffic and restricting YouTube, some limitations must be acknowledged.   
First, it is more difficult to consider all applications that use UDP as a transport protocol 
since UDP does not support flags like TCP.  
Second, this implementation cannot detect encrypted traffic. Therefore, a user can easily 
bypass the firewall policies by running a VPN client. Future work will focus on this area as there 
are ways to analyze encrypted traffic such as packet size, direction, and timing [40]. 
Third, this implementation is not meant for production use; therefore, it does not support 
some features such as updating CSV files, which contain the firewall polices while the controller 
is running. Moreover, the implementation supports only one OpenFlow switch at this time. Future 
work will add more features and support for multiple OpenFlow switches. 
Even though OpenFlow protocol makes it possible to program the network, it does not 
make it easy. Therefore, more advanced northbound APIs are required to provide an abstraction 
layer that enables the programmer to run parallel and subsequent modules/ applications without 
worrying about the buffer ID issue and policy conflicts.  
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The current OpenFlow switches allow only a fixed set of “Match-Action” fields. In 
addition, OpenFlow specifications define a limited set of action fields. Therefore, the data plane 
needs to be changed without modifying the hardware in order to support new protocols and higher 
layers [41]. Papers [41] and [42] propose methods to solve this issue. Future work will focus on 
this area as well. 
 
 
***** 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
Firewall products are essential in the network to enforce security. Even though there are 
outstanding firewalls on the market, these firewalls are expensive, their provisioning time is high, 
and they do not provide programmability to network administrators. On the other hand, SDN 
allows the use of commodity hardware, reduces provisioning time, and provides a programmable 
control plane, as explained in chapter two. This paper implemented an OpenFlow-based 
application layer firewall capable of detecting applications such as BitTorrent and YouTube as 
well as preventing a DOS attack, as presented in chapter three. The fourth chapter of this paper 
highlighted the results of the performance analysis and compared the results with those of a 
traditional switch. The trade-off between the security and performance is inevitable in any kind of 
network architecture. Finally, SDN architecture is promising, and it provides the network 
administrators with flexibility and a room for innovation. However, OpenFlow protocol has some 
limitations. It is hoped that the SDN community will collaborate to enhance it further. 
 
***** 
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APPENDIX 
A. Firewall Code 
''' 
APPLICATION LAYER FIREWALL USING OPENFLOW 
By 
Alaauddin Shieha 
This project is part of a thesis submitted to the 
Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Colorado in partial fulfillment 
of the requirement for the degree of 
Master of Science 
 
This project intends to use the POX SDN controller and Pica8 OpenFlow enabled Switch 
to implement an application layer (layer 7) Firewall capable of detecting and blocking BitTorrent 
and YouTube traffic as well as preventing 
some kinds of DOS attacks. 
  
The firewall table matching rules will be based on source and destination IP addresses and port 
numbers. 
The application table supports two applications: BitTorrent and YouTube. It blocks these 
applications if the source IP address of the packet matches the App_table.  
The POX build-in L2 learning switch module is combined in this implementation to provide 
forwarding service.  
The firewall-policies.csv file stores the rules that the firewall will be using to build the firewall 
table and then create flow entries to drop matched packets. 
''' 
 
from pox.core import core 
import pox.openflow.libopenflow_01 as of 
from pox.lib.revent import * 
from pox.lib.util import dpid_to_str 
from pox.lib.util import str_to_bool 
from pox.lib.util import dpidToStr  
from pox.lib.addresses import EthAddr 
from pox.lib.addresses import IPAddr 
from pox.lib.packet import * 
from pox.lib.packet.packet_base import packet_base 
from types import * 
import os 
import csv 
import time 
 
log = core.getLogger() 
 
# We don't want to flood immediately when a switch connects. 
# Can be overridden on command line. 
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_flood_delay = 0 
PolicyFile = "%s/pox/pox/misc/firewall-policies.csv" % os.environ[ 'HOME' ]  # The file that 
contains the rules 
ApplicationFile = "%s/pox/pox/misc/Applications.csv" % os.environ[ 'HOME' ]  # The file that 
contains the rules 
 
 
 
class Master (EventMixin): 
    '''  
    Master class that listens to multiple events and decides which module should start first. 
    Inherit from EventMixin. More information on EventMixin could be found in the link below: 
    https://github.com/noxrepo/pox/blob/carp/pox/lib/revent/revent.py 
    ''' 
    def __init__ (self, transparent): 
        ''' 
        Especial method that gets invoked when the Master object gets created. 
        It listens to events on core.openflow (source) and creates an empty firewall_table (dic), 
flow_table, MacToPort table, and application table 
        For more info: https://github.com/noxrepo/pox/blob/carp/pox/lib/revent/revent.py  
        ''' 
        self.listenTo(core.openflow) 
        self.transparent = transparent 
        core.openflow.addListeners(self, "all")   
        log.debug("Enabling Firewall Module") 
        self.firewall_table = {} 
        self.flow_table = {} 
        self.macToPort = {} 
        self.App_table = {} 
        self.hold_down_expired = _flood_delay == 0 
        self.insideNetwork = ["172.20.74.0/24"] 
 
 
    def _handle_ConnectionUp (self, event): 
        ''' 
        This method has a special meaning to listenTo() and/or addListeners() 
        The method is automatically registered as an event handler, which will be called whenever 
core.openflow triggers a ConnectionUp event. 
        It builds the firewall table and the application table when the switch connects to the 
controller. 
        For more info: https://github.com/noxrepo/pox/blob/carp/pox/lib/revent/revent.py 
        '''    
        with open(PolicyFile, 'rb') as f: 
            reader = csv.reader(f) 
            for row in reader: 
                if row[1] != "srcip": 
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                    self.AddPolicy(dpidToStr(event.dpid), IPAddr(row[1]), IPAddr(row[2]), 
int(row[3]), self.Str_Bool(row[4])) 
 
        with open(ApplicationFile, 'rb') as A: 
            Apps = csv.reader(A) 
            for row in Apps: 
                if row[1] != "Application":     
                    self.Add_App(str(row[1]), IPAddr(row[2]), self.Str_Bool(row[3])) 
 
 
    def Add_App(self, app="", host="", value=False): 
        ''' 
        This method adds the applications in the CSV file to the application table (App_table) 
        ''' 
        self.App_table[(app, host)] = value 
        log.debug("Building Application Table by adding App policy: For: %s, From: %s, Action: 
%s", app, host, str(value)) 
 
 
    def Str_Bool(self, policy): 
        ''' 
        This method convert the a list of words to either True or False (Boolean) 
        ''' 
        if str(policy).lower() in ("yes", "y", "true", "t", "allow", "permit", "1"): return True 
        if str(policy).lower() in ("no", "n", "false", "f", "block", "deny", "0", ""): return False 
 
 
    def AddPolicy(self, dpidstr, srcip="", dstip="", port=0, value=False): 
        ''' 
        This method adds the policies to the dictionary and sets the value to False if it was not 
specified in the csv file. 
        ''' 
        self.firewall_table[(dpidstr, srcip, dstip, port)] = value 
        self.firewall_table[(dpidstr, dstip, srcip, port)] = value 
        log.debug("Building Firewall Table by adding firewall policy: From: %s, To: %s, Action: 
%s", srcip, dstip, str(value)) 
 
 
    def checkIPinside(self, ip, event): 
        ''' 
        Check if the IP is from inside the network or not. Check IN-Port to make sure that the IP is 
not spoofed to look like it's coming 
        from outside. 
        ''' 
        for network in self.insideNetwork: 
            if ip.inNetwork(network) or event.port != 1: 
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                return True 
        return False 
 
 
    def _handle_all_PacketIn (self, event): 
        ''' 
        This method has a special meaning to addListeners() 
        It will be called whenever core.openflow triggers a PacketIn event. 
        It calls Firewall method first and then based on the value returned by the firewall method it 
might call the LearningSwitch method 
        with instruction passed as an argument. 
        ''' 
        SendToSwitch = self.Firewall(event) 
        if SendToSwitch == "Mod": 
            self.LearningSwitch(event,"Mod") 
        if SendToSwitch == "Pktout": 
            self.LearningSwitch(event,"Pktout") 
 
 
    def Firewall(self, event): 
        ''' 
        This method parses the packet and check it against the firewall table if it is either TCP or 
UDP, and against the application table 
        if the source IP address is in the application table. It returns "Mod" or "Pktout" to instruct 
the switch mothod or it drops the packet 
        and return False, which means does not pass this packet to the switch method. 
        ''' 
        def Packet_out_Send_FIN(event, segmant, ip, packet): 
            ''' 
            This method is part of the firewall method and it is used only when the packet is an 
HTTP GET message destined for YouTube website. 
            It drops the packet without installing a flow entry, and builds a TCP FIN packet and 
sends it back to the host in order to close its connection. 
            ''' 
            msg = of.ofp_packet_out() 
            msg.data = event.ofp 
            event.connection.send(msg) 
 
            tcp_packet = tcp() 
            tcp_packet.srcport = segmant.dstport 
            tcp_packet.dstport = segmant.srcport 
            tcp_packet.len = tcp.MIN_LEN+20 
            tcp_packet.win = 1 
            tcp_packet._setflag(tcp_packet.FIN_flag,1) 
            tcp_packet._setflag(tcp_packet.ACK_flag,1) 
            tcp_packet.seq = segmant.ack 
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            tcp_packet.ack = segmant.seq + segmant.payload_len 
            ipv4_packet = ipv4() 
            ipv4_packet.iplen = ipv4.MIN_LEN + tcp_packet.len 
            ipv4_packet.protocol = ipv4.TCP_PROTOCOL 
            ipv4_packet.dstip = ip.dstip 
            ipv4_packet.srcip = ip.srcip 
            ipv4_packet.set_payload(tcp_packet) 
            eth_packet = ethernet() 
            eth_packet.set_payload(ipv4_packet) 
            eth_packet.src = packet.dst #MAC Controller 
            eth_packet.dst = packet.src 
            eth_packet.type = ethernet.IP_TYPE 
            msg = of.ofp_packet_out(data = eth_packet) 
            msg.actions.append(of.ofp_action_output(port = event.port)) 
            event.connection.send(msg) 
 
 
        def Applications(event, segmant, ip, packet, app, direction): 
            ''' 
            This method checks the packet payload for application signatures. If a signature is found, 
it will drop the packet or call Packet_out_Send_FIN 
            and delete the key from the flow table. 
            ''' 
            if app == "BitTorrent": 
                signature = "BitTorrent protocol" 
            elif app == "Youtube": 
                signature = "Host: www.youtube.com" 
 
            if isinstance(segmant.payload, packet_base) or isinstance(segmant.payload, NoneType): 
                return True 
 
            elif signature in segmant.payload: 
                if signature == "BitTorrent protocol": 
                    self.Drop(event, ip.srcip, ip.dstip, segmant.dstport, "dst") 
                    log.debug("This is BitTorrent Handshake and drop message has been sent") 
                elif signature == "Host: www.youtube.com" and direction == "inside": 
                    Packet_out_Send_FIN(event, segmant, ip, packet) 
                    log.debug("This is HTTP GET for Youtube.com. The packet has been droped and 
TCP FIN Packet to close the connection") 
 
                if direction == "inside": 
                    key = (ip.srcip, ip.dstip, segmant.srcport, segmant.dstport) 
                else: 
                    key = (ip.dstip, ip.srcip, segmant.dstport, segmant.srcport) 
                try: 
                    del self.flow_table[key] 
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                except KeyError: 
                    log.debug("Another BitTorrent Handshake coming right after deleting the flow from 
the other side of the connection") 
                return False 
 
 
        dpidstr = dpidToStr(event.dpid) #to Convert a DPID in the canonical string form into a long 
int for more info: https://github.com/noxrepo/pox/blob/carp/pox/lib/util.py 
        packet = event.parsed 
        ip = packet.find('ipv4')# to check whether it is an IP packet or not 
        if ip is None: 
            log.debug("This packet isn't IP!") 
            return "Mod"# if it is not IP, do not do anything (let the switch method handles it). 
 
        if packet.find('tcp') is None and packet.find('udp') is None: 
            return "Mod"# if it is neither TCP nor UDP send it to switch method with "Mod" 
instruction. 
        else: 
            if packet.find('tcp') is not None: 
                segmant = packet.find('tcp')### TCP Packet ####### 
                if self.checkIPinside(ip.srcip, event): 
 
                    if self.CheckPolicy(dpidstr, ip.srcip, ip.dstip, segmant.dstport) == False: 
                        self.Drop(event, ip.srcip, ip.dstip, segmant.dstport, "dst") 
                        log.debug("Packet matched the role and dropped") 
                        return False 
 
                    key = (ip.srcip, ip.dstip, segmant.srcport, segmant.dstport)# Build the flow table 
                    if key in self.flow_table: 
                        if self.flow_table[key][:2] == [1, "out"] and segmant.SYN and segmant.ACK: 
                            self.flow_table[key][0] += 1 
                            self.flow_table[key][1] = "in" 
                            log.debug("TCP SYN ACK packet from inside") 
                            return "Pktout" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][:2] == [2,"out"] and segmant.ACK: 
                            self.flow_table[key][0] += 1 
                            self.flow_table[key][1] = "in" 
                            log.debug("TCP ACK Packet from inside ") 
                            return "Pktout" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][0] == 3 and segmant.PSH: 
                            for App in self.App_table: 
                                if App[1] == ip.srcip: 
                                    to_switch_module = Applications(event, segmant, ip, packet, App[0], 
"inside") 
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                                    log.debug("Packet from inside will be sent to switch ? %s", 
str(to_switch_module)) 
                                    if to_switch_module is False: 
                                        return False 
 
                            self.flow_table[key][0] += 1 
                            log.debug("TCP handshacke is done. First packet of connection from inside. 
MOD is done ") 
                            return "Mod" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][0] == 4: 
                            for App in self.App_table: 
                                if App[1] == ip.srcip: 
                                    to_switch_module = Applications(event, segmant, ip, packet, App[0], 
"inside") 
                                    log.debug("Packet from inside will be sent to switch ? %s", 
str(to_switch_module)) 
                                    if to_switch_module is False: 
                                        return False 
 
                            log.debug("TCP handshacke is done. Second packet of connection from inside. 
MOD is done ") 
                            del self.flow_table[key]  # To remove that element (key) from the dictionary in 
order to avoid having a huge flow-table 
                            return "Mod" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][2] < 10:# To take into account retransmission. It has an 
upper limit to prevent DOS 
                            self.flow_table[key][2] += 1 
                            return "Pktout" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][2] > 10: 
                            del self.flow_table[key] 
                            log.debug("DOS attack detected") 
                            self.Drop(event, ip.srcip, ip.dstip, segmant.dstport, "dst") 
                            return False 
 
                    else:## # First Packet from the flow ##### 
                        if segmant.SYN:#a good place to prevent illegal flags combinations 
                            self.flow_table[key] = [1, "in", 0]# the first parameter is a counter for the 
number of packets from that flow, the second is direction, third to prevent from DOS 
                            log.debug("TCP SYN Packet from inside ") 
                            return "Pktout" 
                        else: ######### First packet from flow is not SYN. To prevent installing a flow 
entry if user tries to send first packet without flags in order to pass fw 
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                             log.debug("First or middle of session TCP packet but doesn't have a SYN flag 
(inside)") 
                             return False 
 
                else: 
 
                    if self.CheckPolicy(dpidstr, ip.srcip, ip.dstip, segmant.srcport) == False: 
                        self.Drop(event, ip.srcip, ip.dstip, segmant.srcport, "src") 
                        return False 
 
                    key = (ip.dstip, ip.srcip, segmant.dstport, segmant.srcport) 
                    if key in self.flow_table: 
                        if self.flow_table[key][:2] == [1, "in"] and segmant.SYN and segmant.ACK: 
                            self.flow_table[key][0] += 1 
                            self.flow_table[key][1] = "out" 
                            log.debug("TCP SYN ACK packet from outside") 
                            return "Pktout" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][:2] == [2, "in"] and segmant.ACK: 
                            self.flow_table[key][0] += 1 
                            self.flow_table[key][1] = "out" 
                            log.debug("TCP ACK Packet from outside") 
                            return "Pktout" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][0] == 3 and segmant.PSH: 
                            for App in self.App_table: 
                                if App[1] == ip.dstip: 
                                    to_switch = Applications(event, segmant, ip, packet, App[0], "outside") 
                                    log.debug("Packet from outside will be sent to switch ? %s", 
str(to_switch)) 
                                    if to_switch is False: 
                                        return False 
 
                            self.flow_table[key][0] += 1 
                            log.debug("TCP handshacke is done. First packet of connection from outside. 
MOD is done ") 
                            return "Mod" 
 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][0] == 4: 
                            for App in self.App_table: 
                                if App[1] == ip.dstip: 
                                    to_switch = Applications(event, segmant, ip, packet, App[0], "outside") 
                                    log.debug("Packet from outside will be sent to switch ? %s", 
str(to_switch)) 
                                    if to_switch is False: 
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                                        return False 
 
                            del self.flow_table[key]# To remove that element (key) from the dictionary in 
order to avoid having a huge flow-table 
                            return "Mod" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][2] < 10:# To account for retransmission   
                            self.flow_table[key][2] += 1 
                            return "Pktout" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][2] > 10: 
                            del self.flow_table[key] 
                            log.debug("DOS attack detected") 
                            self.Drop(event, ip.srcip, ip.dstip, segmant.dstport, "dst") 
                            return False 
 
 
                    else: 
                        if segmant.SYN: 
                            self.flow_table[key] = [1, "out", 0]# the first parameter is a counter for the 
number of packets from that flow, the second is direction, third to prevent from DOS 
                            log.debug("Swithc Module: TCP SYN Packet from outside ") 
                            return "Pktout" 
                        else: 
                            log.debug("Swithc Module: first or middle of session TCP packet but doesn't 
have a flag (outside)") 
                            return False 
 
 
            else: 
                segmant = packet.find('udp') ########## UDP Packet ############# 
 
                if self.checkIPinside(ip.srcip, event): 
 
                    if self.CheckPolicy(dpidstr, ip.srcip, ip.dstip, segmant.dstport) == False: 
                        self.Drop(event, ip.srcip, ip.dstip, segmant.dstport, "dst") 
                        log.debug("Packet matched the role and dropped") 
                        return False 
 
                    key = (ip.srcip, ip.dstip, segmant.srcport, segmant.dstport) 
                    if key in self.flow_table: 
                        if self.flow_table[key][:2] == [1, "out"]: 
                            for App in self.App_table: 
                                if App[1] == ip.srcip: 
                                    to_switch_module = Applications(event, segmant, ip, packet, App[0], 
"inside") 
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                                    log.debug("Packet from inside will be sent to switch ? %s", 
str(to_switch_module)) 
                                    if to_switch_module is False: 
                                        return False 
 
                            self.flow_table[key][0] += 1 
                            self.flow_table[key][1] = "in" 
                            log.debug("UDP Packet from inside. Counter is 2 now") 
                            return "Pktout" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][:2] == [2, "out"]: 
                            for App in self.App_table: 
                                if App[1] == ip.srcip: 
                                    to_switch_module = Applications(event, segmant, ip, packet, App[0], 
"inside") 
                                    log.debug("Packet from inside will be sent to switch ? %s", 
str(to_switch_module)) 
                                    if to_switch_module is False: 
                                        return False 
 
                            self.flow_table[key][0] += 1 
                            self.flow_table[key][1] = "in" 
                            log.debug("UDP Packet from inside. Counter is 3 now") 
                            return "Pktout" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][:2] == [3, "out"]: 
                            for App in self.App_table: 
                                if App[1] == ip.srcip: 
                                    to_switch_module = Applications(event, segmant, ip, packet, App[0], 
"inside") 
                                    log.debug("Packet from inside will be sent to switch ? %s", 
str(to_switch_module)) 
                                    if to_switch_module is False: 
                                        return False 
 
                            self.flow_table[key][0] += 1 
                            self.flow_table[key][1] = "in" 
                            log.debug("UDP Packet from inside. Counter is 4 now") 
                            return "Pktout" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][:2] == [4, "out"]: 
                            for App in self.App_table: 
                                if App[1] == ip.srcip: 
                                    to_switch_module = Applications(event, segmant, ip, packet, App[0], 
"inside") 
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                                    log.debug("Packet from inside will be sent to switch ? %s", 
str(to_switch_module)) 
                                    if to_switch_module is False: 
                                        return False 
 
                            del self.flow_table[key] 
                            log.debug("UDP flow is safe. Flow is deleted from flow table") 
                            return "Mod" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][2] < 100: 
                            self.flow_table[key][2] += 1 
                            log.debug("UDP packets that might belong to another type of applications or 
retransmission") 
                            return "Pktout" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][2] > 100: 
                            del self.flow_table[key] 
                            log.debug("A possible DOS attack") 
                            self.Drop(event, ip.srcip, ip.dstip, segmant.dstport, "dst") 
                            return False 
 
                    else: 
                        self.flow_table[key] = [1, "in", 0] 
                        log.debug("First UDP Packet from inside.") 
                        return "Pktout" 
 
                else: 
 
                    if self.CheckPolicy(dpidstr, ip.srcip, ip.dstip, segmant.srcport) == False: 
                        self.Drop(event, ip.srcip, ip.dstip, segmant.srcport, "src") 
                        return False 
 
                    key = (ip.dstip, ip.srcip, segmant.dstport, segmant.srcport) 
                    if key in self.flow_table: 
                        if self.flow_table[key][:2] == [1, "in"]: 
                            for App in self.App_table: 
                                if App[1] == ip.dstip: 
                                    to_switch = Applications(event, segmant, ip, packet, App[0], "outside") 
                                    log.debug("Packet from outside will be sent to switch ? %s", 
str(to_switch)) 
                                    if to_switch is False: 
                                        return False 
 
                            self.flow_table[key][0] += 1 
                            self.flow_table[key][1] = "out" 
                            log.debug("UDP Packet from inside. Counter is 2 now") 
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                            return "Pktout" 
 
                        if self.flow_table[key][:2] == [2, "in"]: 
                            for App in self.App_table: 
                                if App[1] == ip.dstip: 
                                    to_switch = Applications(event, segmant, ip, packet, App[0], "outside") 
                                    log.debug("Packet from outside will be sent to switch ? %s", 
str(to_switch)) 
                                    if to_switch is False: 
                                        return False 
 
                            self.flow_table[key][0] += 1 
                            self.flow_table[key][1] = "out" 
                            log.debug("UDP Packet from inside. Counter is 3 now") 
                            return "Pktout" 
 
                        if self.flow_table[key][:2] == [3, "in"]: 
                            for App in self.App_table: 
                                if App[1] == ip.dstip: 
                                    to_switch = Applications(event, segmant, ip, packet, App[0], "outside") 
                                    log.debug("Packet from outside will be sent to switch ? %s", 
str(to_switch)) 
                                    if to_switch is False: 
                                        return False 
 
                            self.flow_table[key][0] += 1 
                            self.flow_table[key][1] = "out" 
                            log.debug("UDP Packet from inside. Counter is 4 now") 
                            return "Pktout" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][:2] == [4, "in"]: 
                            for App in self.App_table: 
                                if App[1] == ip.dstip: 
                                    to_switch = Applications(event, segmant, ip, packet, App[0], "outside") 
                                    log.debug("Packet from outside will be sent to switch ? %s", 
str(to_switch)) 
                                    if to_switch is False: 
                                        return False 
 
                            del self.flow_table[key] 
                            log.debug("UDP flow is safe. Flow is deleted from flow table") 
                            return "Mod" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][2] < 100: 
                            self.flow_table[key][2] += 1 
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                            log.debug("UDP packets that might belong to another type of applications or 
retransmission") 
                            return "Pktout" 
 
                        elif self.flow_table[key][2] > 100: 
                            del self.flow_table[key] 
                            log.debug("A possible DOS attack") 
                            self.Drop(event, ip.srcip, ip.dstip, segmant.dstport, "dst") 
                            return False 
 
                    else: 
                        self.flow_table[key] = [1, "out", 0] 
                        log.debug("First UDP Packet from outside.") 
                        return "Pktout" 
 
 
    def CheckPolicy(self, dpidstr, srcip="", dstip="", port=0): 
        ''' 
        This method checks the src ip, dst ip, and port number of the packet against the rules and 
return the value of the corresponding policy. 
        It has an implicit True so that the switch can handle un-matched packets for ease of 
implementation. 
        ''' 
        key = (dpidstr, srcip, dstip, port) 
        if key in self.firewall_table: 
            log.debug('Policy From (%s) to (%s) found in %s. The Action is (%s): ', srcip, dstip, 
dpidstr, str(self.firewall_table[key])) 
            return self.firewall_table[key]  
 
        else: 
            log.debug('Policy From (%s) to (%s) NOT found in %s: Pass to Switch Module', srcip, 
dstip, dpidstr) 
            return True # Implicit True 
  
 
             
    def Drop (self, event, src, dst, port, port_type): 
        ''' 
        This method Drops this packet and installs a flow to continue 
        dropping similar ones. 
        Since no action has been added in the flow table modification message, the default is drop. 
        For more info on open flow packets: 
https://openflow.stanford.edu/display/ONL/POX+Wiki#POXWiki-OpenFlowMessages  
        ''' 
        msg = of.ofp_flow_mod() #creats a flow modification message 
        msg.match = of.ofp_match.from_packet(event.parsed, event.port) 
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        msg.match.dl_dst = None 
        msg.idle_timeout = 120 
        msg.priority = 65535 #priority at which a rule will match, higher is better. 
        msg.command = of.OFPFC_MODIFY 
        msg.data = event.ofp 
        event.connection.send(msg)# send the message to the OpenFlow switch 
        log.debug("Firewall dropped packet from (%s) to (%s) and installed a rule on %s", src, dst, 
dpidToStr(event.dpid)) 
 
 
    def LearningSwitch (self, event, whattodo): 
        """ 
        The learning switch "brain" associated with a single OpenFlow switch. 
        When we see a packet, we'd like to output it on a port which will 
        eventually lead to the destination.  To accomplish this, we build a 
        table that maps addresses to ports. 
 
        We populate the table by observing traffic.  When we see a packet 
        from some source coming from some port, we know that source is out 
        that port. 
 
        When we want to forward traffic, we look up the destination in our 
        table.  If we don't know the port, we simply send the message out 
        all ports except the one it came in on.  (In the presence of loops, 
        this is bad!). 
 
        In short, our algorithm looks like this: 
 
        For each packet from the switch: 
        1) Use source address and switch port to update address/port table 
        2) Is transparent = False and either Ether type is LLDP or the packet's 
           destination address is a Bridge Filtered address? 
             Yes: 
                2a) Drop packet -- don't forward link-local traffic (LLDP, 802.1x) 
                    DONE 
        3) Is destination multicast? 
             Yes: 
                3a) Flood the packet 
                    DONE 
        4) Port for destination address in our address/port table? 
             No: 
                4a) Flood the packet 
                    DONE 
        5) Is output port the same as input port? 
             Yes: 
                5a) Drop packet and similar ones for a while 
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        6) Install flow table entry in the switch so that this 
             flow goes out the appropriate port 
             6a) Send the packet out appropriate port 
 
        """ 
        packet = event.parsed 
 
        def flood (message = None): 
            """ Floods the packet """ 
            msg = of.ofp_packet_out() 
            if time.time() - event.connection.connect_time >= _flood_delay: 
                # Only flood if we've been connected for a little while... 
 
                if self.hold_down_expired is False: 
                    # Oh yes it is! 
                    self.hold_down_expired = True 
                    log.info("%s: Flood hold-down expired -- flooding", 
                            dpid_to_str(event.dpid)) 
 
                if message is not None: log.debug(message) 
                #log.debug("%i: flood %s -> %s", event.dpid,packet.src,packet.dst) 
                # OFPP_FLOOD is optional; on some switches you may need to change 
                # this to OFPP_ALL. 
                msg.actions.append(of.ofp_action_output(port = of.OFPP_FLOOD)) 
            else: 
                pass 
                #log.info("Holding down flood for %s", dpid_to_str(event.dpid)) 
            msg.data = event.ofp 
            msg.in_port = event.port 
            event.connection.send(msg) 
 
 
        def drop (duration = None): 
            """ 
            Drops this packet and optionally installs a flow to continue 
            dropping similar ones for a while 
            """ 
            if duration is not None: 
                if not isinstance(duration, tuple): 
                    duration = (duration,duration) 
                msg = of.ofp_flow_mod() 
                msg.match = of.ofp_match.from_packet(packet) 
                msg.match.dl_dst = None 
                msg.idle_timeout = duration[0] 
                msg.hard_timeout = duration[1] 
                msg.buffer_id = event.ofp.buffer_id 
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                event.connection.send(msg) 
            elif event.ofp.buffer_id is not None: 
                msg = of.ofp_packet_out() 
                msg.buffer_id = event.ofp.buffer_id 
                msg.in_port = event.port 
                event.connection.send(msg) 
 
 
        def Packet_out(port): 
            ''' 
            Send this packet out without installing a flow entry. 
            ''' 
            msg = of.ofp_packet_out() 
            msg.actions.append(of.ofp_action_output(port = port)) 
            msg.data = event.ofp 
            event.connection.send(msg) 
 
 
        def Mod_Message(packet, port): 
            ''' 
            Send this packet out and install a flow entry for subsequent packets 
            ''' 
            msg = of.ofp_flow_mod() 
            msg.match = of.ofp_match.from_packet(packet, event.port) 
            msg.match.dl_dst = None 
            msg.idle_timeout = 60 
            msg.actions.append(of.ofp_action_output(port = port)) 
            msg.buffer_id = event.ofp.buffer_id 
            event.connection.send(msg) 
         
 
        self.macToPort[packet.src] = event.port # 1 
 
        if not self.transparent: # 2 
            if packet.type == packet.LLDP_TYPE or packet.dst.isBridgeFiltered(): 
                drop() # 2a 
                return 
 
        if packet.dst.is_multicast: 
            flood() # 3a 
        else: 
            if packet.dst not in self.macToPort: # 4 
                flood("Port for %s unknown -- flooding" % (packet.dst,)) # 4a 
            else: 
                port = self.macToPort[packet.dst] 
                if port == event.port: # 5 
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                    # 5a 
                    log.warning("Same port for packet from %s -> %s on %s.%s.  Drop." 
                            % (packet.src, packet.dst, dpid_to_str(event.dpid), port)) 
                    drop(10) 
                    return 
                # 6 
                if whattodo == "Mod": 
                    Mod_Message(packet, port) 
                elif whattodo == "Pktout": 
                    Packet_out(port) 
 
 
def launch (transparent=False, hold_down=_flood_delay): 
    """ 
    Starts The Master class. 
    """ 
    try: 
        global _flood_delay 
        _flood_delay = int(str(hold_down), 10) 
        assert _flood_delay >= 0 
    except: 
        raise RuntimeError("Expected hold-down to be a number") 
 
    core.registerNew(Master, str_to_bool(transparent)) 
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B. Pica8 Configuration 
 
1. reboot 
2. Choose OpenFlow 
3. Choose manual configuration 
4. Type the following command:  
ovsdb-tool create /ovs/ovs-vswitchd.conf.db /ovs/bin/vswitch.ovsschema 
5. Statically configure the IP address through the command: 
ifconfig eth0 192.168.100.2 netmask 255.255.255.0 up 
6. Start the OVS Database Server: 
ovsdb-server /ovs/ovs-vswitchd.conf.db --remote=ptcp:6633:192.168.100.2 & 
7. Start the OVS Daemon: 
ovs-vswitchd tcp:192.168.100.2:6633 --pidfile=pica8 --overwrite-pidfile > 
/var/log/ovs.log 2>/dev/null & 
8. Create the bridge and add ports to it: 
ovs-vsctl --db=tcp:192.168.100.2:6633 add-br br0 -- set bridge br0 datapath_type=pica8 
ovs-vsctl --db=tcp:192.168.100.2:6633 add-port br0 ge-1/1/1 -- set Interface ge-1/1/1 
type=pica8 
ovs-vsctl --db=tcp:192.168.100.2:6633 add-port br0 ge-1/1/13 -- set Interface ge-1/1/13 
type=pica8 
ovs-vsctl --db=tcp:192.168.100.2:6633 add-port br0 ge-1/1/14 -- set Interface ge-1/1/14 
type=pica8 
ovs-vsctl --db=tcp:192.168.100.2:6633 add-port br0 ge-1/1/15 -- set Interface ge-1/1/15 
type=pica8 
9. Add the controller to the bridge: 
ovs-vsctl --db=tcp:192.168.100.2:6633 set-controller br0 tcp:192.168.100.1:6633 
 
 
A useful show commands: 
 ovs-ofctl show br0 
 ovs-ofctl dump-flows br0 
 ovs-ofctl dump-ports br0 
 
 
 
  
